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Abstract: This paper examines the role of the ECB communication activities on daily 
Eurodollar exchange rate and interest rates. We estimate the relationship between 
monetary policy and the exchange rate using a technique that explicitly recognizes the 
joint determination of both the levels and volatilities of these variables. We also consider 
more traditional estimation strategies as a test of the robustness of our main results. We 
introduce a new indicator of ECB communications policies that focuses on what the ECB 
says about the future economic outlook for the euro area along five different economic 
dimensions. The impact of ECB communications policies is more apparent in the time 
series framework than in the heteroskedasticity estimator approach. Time series estimates 
reveal that interest rate changes generally have a much larger impact on exchange rate 
movements, and their volatility, than do ECB verbal pronouncements. Previous studies 
that conclude that news effects are significant at the daily frequency may have reached 
such a conclusion because the measurement of news was too highly aggregated. The 
endogeneity of the exchange rate-interest rate relationship is more apparent when the 
proxy for monetary policy is the euro area-US differential than when any other proxy for 
monetary policy is employed. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: F3, E5, E6 
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1. Introduction 
The brief history of the euro to date is a turbulent one. Some have pointed to the 
fact that a new and untried monetary institution became responsible for a single monetary 
policy in 11 sovereign states as one reason for the turbulences. Others have focused on 
the inability of the fledgling central bank to clearly communicate its policy stance. Critics 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) like, for example, Svensson (2003) argue that its 
two-pillars policy is confusing, if not downright inappropriate.
1 Others have praised the 
ECB, especially under its first President, Wim Duisenberg, for trying to avoid at all costs 
the temptation to surprise markets (Sims 2004). Evidence, both of the time series and 
event study varieties, points to some significant impact of ECB deeds and words on the 
Eurodollar exchange rate and a modest, but improving, credibility (e.g., Fatum and 
Hutchison 2002, Jansen and De Haan 2005, Fratzscher 2004, Goldberg and Klein 2005) 
which suggests some capacity on the ECB’s part to surprise markets. 
On a number of occasions the importance attached by senior ECB officials to the 
euro exchange rate, and its volatility, has been unclear. For example, Duisenberg was 
quoted as arguing that, while the Eurodollar exchange rate is an important indicator, there 
is little reason to influence its value as a matter of policy. Nevertheless, the former ECB 
President, who left office in November 2003, expressed a concern about the volatility of 
the Eurodollar exchange rate (Duisenberg 1999b). His successor, Jean-Claude Trichet, 
                                                 
1 The ECB, on its own account, conducted a review of its monetary policy strategy in 
2003. The two-pillars approach consists in combining a price stability objective aiming 
for below but close to 2% inflation, together with a reliance on monetary indicators to 
help ensure that the price stability objective is being met over the medium-term.   2 
apparently feels the same way, at least if we interpret a commentary of his written for the 
French press (Trichet 2005).
2 The bottom line is that the ECB, as do other central banks, 
use a mix of words and deeds to influence expectations. It is less clear whether the 
statements of central bankers can influence exchange rate levels or its volatility. Indeed, 
Bini Smaghi (2006) warned financial markets that the clarity of signals about future 
interest rate movements will depend on the circumstances, and that precise guidance 
cannot always be forthcoming from central banks. Since interest rate decisions have 
implications for exchange rate dynamics there is even more reason to explore the impact 
of words versus deeds on the euro exchange rate. 
This paper examines how policy actions, namely interest rate decisions, ‘words’, or 
‘open mouth operations’, of the ECB, and market news combine to impact changes and 
the volatility of the euro/USD exchange rate. To do so, the researcher faces a well-known 
identification problem. An example illustrates this phenomenon. In September 2000, the 
ECB formally intervened in foreign exchange markets in support of the Euro. In 
September 2001, the US experienced terrorist attacks with worldwide repercussions for 
financial markets. Both events, one policy related the other not, had a temporary effect on 
the levels of the Eurodollar exchange rate. In contrast, only the policy intervention by the 
ECB appears to have had a noticeable impact on exchange rate volatility. This suggests 
that one useful way of identifying the impact of central bank actions, both verbal and 
direct varieties, is to utilize the information contained in the volatility of exchange rate 
                                                 
2  Similar concerns are also being voiced in the US where minutes of the FOMC in 
November 2005 suggest that the Fed may provide markets with less guidance in future 
(www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20051101.htm).   3 
movements. Indeed, this is the device used in this paper to deal with the endogenous 
relationship between interest rates and exchange rates. While not the only device 
available under the circumstances, this approach sheds new light on the determinants of 
the euro/USD exchange rate at the daily frequency. 
Our study adds to a small but expanding literature that attempts to identify how the 
actions and statements made by ECB officials influence the exchange rate. Studies that 
consider how news or central bank pronouncements affect asset prices typically rely on a 
rather narrow set of variables to capture surprise announcements. The universe of 
potential information that can have an impact on the exchange rate is undoubtedly large. 
Consequently, we rely on a principal components analysis to reduce the dimensionality of 
potential sources of news effects on the Eurodollar exchange rate.
3 This strategy proves 
to have important implications for the significance of news events on exchange rate 
developments even at the daily frequency. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The following section reviews the 
relevant literature on news effects and monetary policy with particular reference to the 
relationship between asset prices and central bank behavior. Next, we describe the data 
used in the study prior to presenting some stylized facts about the data set in question. 
                                                 
3  Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) widen the vector of variables that traditionally 
constitute news for foreign exchange markets to include information not typically 
considered fundamental in an economic sense. They conclude that the explanatory power 
of high frequency models of exchange rate behavior can be substantially improved with 
the addition of such variables.   4 
The empirical evidence is then discussed after a discussion of methodological issues. The 
paper concludes with a summary and questions left for future research. 
 
2. News and the Exchange Rate: A Selective Literature Review 
The literature on news and its impact on various financial asset prices, including the 
exchange rate, is extensive. In the past, research has tended to concentrate on the impact 
of news releases originating primarily from the financial press on interest rates, exchange 
rates and stock returns issued (e.g., Cochrane 2005, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997). 
In general, there is growing interest in attempting to extract a separate influence from 
various types of news releases emanating from central banks (e.g., Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson 2005, Siklos and Bohl 2006).
4 Recently, attention has turned to the reaction of 
interest rates and exchange rates to news. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004a), Fratzscher 
(2004), Jansen and De Haan (2005), Goldberg and Klein (2004), and Beine, Janssen and 
Lecourt (2004) represent just a sampling of recent empirical studies of the impact of news 
on exchange rate movements and their volatility. 
A few studies (e.g., Connolly and Kohler 2004, Rigobon and Sack 2004) use 
interest rate futures or forward exchange rates to proxy forward-looking sentiment in 
financial markets. There are also studies that examine changes in (spot) exchange rates 
and their reaction to news, as reported by the financial press, central banks, or both (e.g., 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2003).There are at least three explanations for this development. 
First, many central banks now rely on an overnight interest rate, or a similar instrument, 
                                                 
4 For a survey of the kinds of information now provided by central banks on a regular 
basis, see Siklos (2002).   5 
to guide the general level of interest rates. Second, monetary authorities in a large number 
of countries are now seen as more autonomous, transparent, and accountable to 
governments, in particular, but to markets and the public more generally (e.g., Bernanke, 
Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen 1999, and Siklos 2002). 
In response, central banks have become more “talkative”. There is growing 
recognition that monetary authorities can influence markets on a daily basis. Finally, 
there is a possibility that, at times, the “words” of central bankers might substitute for 
direct “action” (Siklos and Bohl 2006, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2005). In what 
follows we briefly focus on three questions that have pre-occupied researchers in recent 
years. They are, not necessarily in order of importance: the estimation methodology 
employed, the measurement of news effects, and the choice of sampling frequency. 
Estimation often proceeds by regressing the change, or expected change, in the 
financial asset price of interest on proxies for unexpected events since this is what is 
believed to constitute “news”. The relevant proxies are themselves generated in a variety 
of ways, as will be explained below. However, most objective measures of news or 
surprises are defined in the following fashion: 
t k








= , (1) 
where  t k s ,  is the surprise component of an announcement type k , at time t , which is 
evaluated as the difference between the announced value of the economic indicator in 
question  A and its median or mean expected value E  based on forecast or survey data. 
Dividing by the sample standard deviation σ   of announcements of the same variety   6 
standardizes  t k t k E A , , − , and permits a comparison of regression coefficients across 
different kinds of announcements. 
Most of the estimated models tend to be univariate regressions, possibly with other 
added controls. Since Engle’s (1982) seminal work, it is now customary to argue that 
unexpected events can simultaneously influence the volatility of asset prices, and not just 
their levels. This has led most researchers to resort to conditional volatility models, 
usually of the GARCH(1,1) or EGARCH(1,1) variety, since they are often successful 
specifications aimed at capturing the time-varying nature of volatility in asset returns. 
Almost all of the papers cited earlier can be characterized as adopting either one or both 
estimation strategies in question. 
A few studies have also recognized that asset markets for different financial assets 
are linked and, at least in part, possibly jointly determined and have proposed an 
alternative estimation strategy to deal with the endogeneity problem (e.g., Rigobon and 
Sack 2004, Bohl, Siklos, and Werner 2006). Thus, for example, a connection between 
stock returns and bond yields has long been thought to exist.
5 Similarly, there is the well-
known uncovered interest parity relationship between exchange rates and interest rates 
differentials, or the link between the slope of the yield curve and economic fundamentals. 
Each of these approaches has generated a voluminous literature. 
All of these studies share a common feature, namely reliance on time series 
modeling. In contrast, the finance literature has often relied on event type studies wherein 
                                                 
5 The relevant literature has a long history, though the evidence sorting out the most 
empirically relevant links is unclear, as several hypotheses exist relating stock market 
behavior to interest rate movements. For example, see Canova and De Nicolo (2000).   7 
the reaction of a financial asset price is measured within a somewhat arbitrarily defined 
window of time. While such studies can be useful, they do suffer from the fact that, 
however narrow the window, other factors that can influence the link between news and 
asset price returns are not necessarily adequately controlled for.
6 We return to this issue 
below. 
Clearly, the potential role of news will crucially depend on the variables used to 
measure it. At the risk of oversimplifying matters, there are two types of variables that 
are thought to represent news. Governments, and other private institutions, release a 
heavy flow of data at regular intervals. Often, such announcements arrive during the first 
two weeks of each month. Some are initial estimates of current economic conditions 
others are revised figures from earlier data releases. Almost simultaneously, both current 
forecasts and ones over some specified future horizon, are also released. Hence, the 
difference between a current release and the relevant forecast, serves as a proxy for a 
surprise announcement. For the US alone, the Bloomberg service reports at least 83 
announcements on a regular basis, usually monthly or, occasionally, quarterly. Some 
authors (e.g., Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega 2005) differentiate between 
positive, or favorable, and negative, or unfavorable, news events. 
However, there are no systematic attempts to explain how the selection of news 
releases for analysis is chosen. For example, Ramchander, Simpson, and Chaudhry 
(2005) rely on 23 separate releases of US macroeconomic indicators, in a study of news 
effects on bond yields, while Connolly and Kohler (2004) use only 12 announcement 
types from the same source. This implies that most studies of news effects that rely on 
                                                 
6 MacKinlay (1997) reviews the event-study literature. Also, see LeRoy (2004).   8 
announcement type data resort to a form of censoring. Although the degree of censoring 
is an empirical question, there is little doubt that some announcements may, or may not, 
consistently affect asset markets, and the exchange rate in particular, even if the 
announcement in question is deemed to be one that markets are believed to react to on a 
regular basis. 
More recently, and in line with the burgeoning interest in the impact of central bank 
policies on asset price developments, several authors have sought to quantify, typically 
via the specification of dummy variables, the significance or meaning of statements, press 
releases, speeches, and other announcements emanating from central bank officials. In 
some cases (e.g., the US Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of England) the mere fact that 
officials who set the course of monetary policy meet at regular, pre-announced, intervals 
gives rise to the possibility of news around meeting days. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004b), Fratzscher (2004), Jansen and De Haan (2005), 
Kohn and Sack (2003), and Beine, Janssen and Lecourt (2004) are studies that attempt to 
classify words and deeds of central bankers alongside other sources of news. While many 
of the news sources are of the objective variety, that is, they are quantifiable, others are 
subject to the interpretation of the researcher who is attempting to determine from a 
particular statement, or speech, whether a central bank official is calling for higher or 
lower future interest rates, or some other financial asset price such as the exchange rate or 
stock prices. Consequently, as noted previously, there is clearly potential either for bias 
or for interpreting statements differently in hindsight. It is also conceivable that 
statements are deliberately meant to obscure a central bank’s likely course of action.   9 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the central bank is reasonably transparent about 
what it deems to be the future outlook for the economy, such statements, together with 
the publication of inflation reports and staff forecasts, can be reasonably said to contain 
some information about likely central bank actions.
7  Just as important, there is a 
conscious attempt to identify statements that signal tighter versus looser future monetary 
policy or a stronger or weaker future value for the exchange rate (e.g., Fratzscher 2004, 
Fatum and Hutchison 2002). Hence, asymmetries in the conduct of monetary policy are 
explicitly recognized. Another form of asymmetry comes from the geographic source of 
news events. For most countries, news from US sources would have a significant 
independent influence on other countries’ financial markets (e.g., Connolly and Kohler 
2004). Regardless of how qualitative statements are measured, they are typically assumed 
to have, at most, a temporary same day effect on the asset return in question, in keeping 
with the notion that news effects dissipate quickly. 
The foregoing brings us to the question of sampling frequency. Goodhart et al. 
(1993), and Andersen et al. (2005), among others, find that news events dissipate within a 
matter of hours. Hence, estimating news effects on asset prices at, say, the daily 
frequency will generally under estimate the short-run effect of unexpected events on asset 
prices. The recent evidence of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) would appear to 
support such a view. Dominguez and Pathanak (2005) also consider intra-daily news 
                                                 
7 Depending upon whether market participants read complete statements from central 
bank officials, instead of a selection published in, say, a particular newspaper source, this 
will have consequences for the possibility of media spin or bias (Mullainathan and 
Shleifer 2004).   10 
effects but conclude that previous studies define news rather narrowly. As a result, they 
are able to conclude that there is useful information content at the daily frequency. 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004a,b) also defend the resort to daily data on the grounds that 
intra-daily data capture an overreaction to news events
8 which does not entirely eliminate 
the possibility that news effects are longer lived than some believe. Others believe that 
investors underreact to information, especially of the bad variety. 
Moreover, there is a presumption that markets react to the same news at the same 
time. Not only is news transmitted to different markets with a delay, albeit a short one, 
there is considerable evidence that agents censor information. In addition, central banks 
communicate not only to financial markets but to the public more generally. If using 
ultra-high frequency data, should we rely on the exact timing of the release of 
information to newswire, or rather rely on the timing of when the information (e.g., as in 
a speech) is actually released? Also, once intra-daily data are used, the investigator must 
choose a window (e.g., 5 minutes or 20 minutes) and there is the possibility that such a 
choice can bias findings about the strength of the connection between news and exchange 
rate behavior. 
Lastly, the focus on exchange rate developments ignores the information content in 
the volume of transactions. Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) document the potentially 
important role of the volume of transactions in explaining the volatility of exchange rate 
movements, while Evans and Lyons (2003, 2005) argue that there is information content 
                                                 
8 This is a reflection of the so-called “irrational exuberance” phenomenon coined by Alan 
Greenspan, and later emphasized by Shiller (2000).   11 
on the order flow in currency markets. The role played by the order flow seems to be 
potentially more important for intra-daily data than at the daily frequency.
9 
 
3. Estimation Strategy and Econometric Issues 
Exchange rates and interest rates are jointly determined. Define  t e Δ  to represent the 
rate of change in the nominal Euro-US-dollar exchange rate,  t MP   is an indicator of 
monetary policy, such as an interest rate or an interest rate differential, and  t C  
summarizes the information content of press releases and other forms of communications 
emanating from the ECB. We can write the relationship of interest as follows: 
t t t t t Z C e MP ε γ δ β + + + Δ = , (2) 
t t t t t Z C MP e η θ α + + + = Δ , (3) 
where  t Z  represents a vector of other variables (normalized to one in equation (3)) that 
influence monetary policy and the exchange rate such as news announcements, day of the 
week effects, and so on, assumed to be exogenous. All other variables were previously 
defined. Equation (2) is a policy reaction function, while equation (3) contains the 
parameters of interest, namely α  and θ . The parameter α   measures the impact of 
monetary policy on the exchange rate and θ  captures the effect of ECB communications 
on the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate. The errors  t ε  and  t η  are, respectively, the shocks 
                                                 
9 They also allude to a possible additional advantage of relying on daily data, namely that 
this is the highest frequency at which the exchange rate can be described as a martingale. 
By contrast, exchange rates tend to be mean reverting at ultra-high frequencies.   12 
to monetary policy and the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate. The disturbances are assumed 
to be serially uncorrelated,  0 ) , ( = t t E η ε  and  0 ) , ( ) , ( = = t t t t Z E Z E η ε . 
As in Rigobon and Sack (2004), equations (2) and (3) impose a minimum of 
structure on the data. However, these same equations cannot be consistently estimated 
using OLS because of the simultaneity issue discussed earlier. Instead, Rigobon and Sack 
(2004) recommend identifying two sub-samples, such that: 
NP P
ε ε σ σ >  (4) 
NP P




Z σ σ =  (6) 
where 
P σ  and 
NP σ  refer to the volatility of the time series of interest in “policy”  ) (P  
and “non-policy”  ) (NP  samples. These sub-samples are defined below in greater detail. 
Expressions (4) to (6) represent identification assumptions where it is hypothesized that 
policy shocks are greater on policy days than on non-policy days (inequality (4)). The 
combination of interest rate announcements and economic outlook information contained 
in press releases explain such an inequality. Inequalities (5) and (6) assume that shocks to 
asset prices and to other exogenous influences on  t e Δ  and  t MP  are the same on policy 
and non-policy days. As argued in Rigobon and Sack (2004), inequalities (4) to (6) 
represent a weaker set of inequalities than in the traditional event-study approach where it 
is assumed that the variability of policy shocks is strictly greater than the variance of 
either exogenous influences on  t MP  and  t e Δ  or those in the exchange rate equation (i.e., 
η σ ).   13 
Rigobon and Sack (2004) discuss how α  and θ  can be estimated by implementing 
instrumental variable estimation. Define the following variables to include a proxy for 
monetary policy and the exchange rate on policy and non-policy dates such that all days 
in the sample may be included: 
{} { } NP t MP P t MP MP t t t ∈ ∪ ∈ = , , , (7) 
{} { } NP t e P t e e t t t ∈ Δ ∪ ∈ Δ = Δ , , , (8) 
which are both 2T x 1 vectors (where T is the number of policy dates). Now define the 
following instruments: 
{} { } NP t MP P t MP w t t MP ∈ − ∪ ∈ ≡ , , , (9) 
{} { } NP t e P t e w t t e ∈ Δ − ∪ ∈ Δ = , , , (10) 
Rigobon and Sack’s (2004) approach implies that estimates for α  can be obtained by 
regressing the change in the in the exchange rate,  t e Δ , on the MP proxy (or its change) 
over the combined P  and  NP  samples, using instrumental variables estimation where 
MP w  and  e w  are the instruments. They further demonstrate that  MP w  and  e w  are valid 
instruments for estimating α  under the assumptions that the parameters in (1) and (2) are 
stable, that asset price shocks are homoskedastic, and that monetary policy shocks are 
heteroskedasctic.
10  The framework also permits testing whether the relatively more 
stringent assumptions of the traditional event study approach can be rejected. As 
                                                 
10 The sets  P  and  NP  are assumed to have the same number of observations. If the 
number of observations in these sets differs, Rigobon and Sack (2004) argue that the 
instruments and the variables have to be divided by the square root of the number of dates.   14 
demonstrated by Rigobon and Sack (2004), a Hausman type specification test is used to 
test the null that the event study assumptions hold. 
Finally, it is worth comparing the results from the foregoing identification approach 
against estimates from traditional time series estimation. This would consist in a 
conditional volatility model, that is, jointly estimating equation (3), the focus of our 
investigation, and the conditional variances via an EGARCH(1,1) model which is 
written: 




1 1 1 0 − − − − − + + + + + = t t t t t t t t h C MP h h h τ θ α ξ λ ξ τ τ , (11) 
where  t h  is the conditional variance and all other terms have already been defined. The 
EGARCH(1,1) formulation has a number of advantages over the popular GARCH(1,1) 
alternative, including the fact that  t h  can never be negative, the standardizing of  t ξ  as 
well as the possibility of testing for asymmetry depending on whether  1 τ  is positive or 
negative. Many in the related literature have resorted to the EGARCH for the same 





To ensure comparability with much of the recent literature on the determinants of 
eurozone exchange rates and the communications activities of the ECB, we rely on daily 
                                                 
11  In principle, estimates of  ' α  and  ' θ   could then be similarly identified using the 
Rigobon-Sack procedure outlined above. While we have done so (results not shown) the 
relevant econometric theory has not yet been developed for this case.   15 
data since 1999. Exchange rate, interest rate, and other financial asset prices are from 
Datastream, Reuters, and Bloomberg. Data for the euro reference exchange rate vis-á-vis 
the US dollar are from the ECB. Interest rate data for the euro area consist of yields on 
repos (eurepo) and the euribor for various maturities.
12 For the US, the fed funds, fed 
funds target and fed funds futures data were obtained from Datastream, as were forward 
exchange rates for the euro against the US dollar. Fed fund futures data are for overnight 
fed funds held for 30 days published by the Chicago Board of Trade. 
Institutional data, consisting of statements from central bankers, the dates of 
meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee, and the ECB’s governing council, are 
from the web sites of the US Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(www.federalreserve.gov) and the ECB (www.ecb.int). Results from the Reuters Poll of 
ECB interest rate expectations were obtained from Reuters. Also from Reuters are the 
implied volatilities for ‘at the money’ foreign currency options for a variety of maturities 
ranging from one week to one year. Although the jury is out on whether implied 
volatilities provide relatively superior forecasts of future volatility, financial market 
participants find them to be a useful way of gauging large price changes primarily 
because of liquidity concerns. Hence, implied volatilities may be especially useful in 
capturing information about “high stress” events. 
Forecasts for inflation and real GDP growth for the US, the euro area, and 
individual euro area countries are from Consensus Economics (www.consensus-
economics.com). Consensus economics surveys panelists during the first two weeks of 
                                                 
12 The euribor (euro interbank offer rate) and EONIA (euro overnight index average yield) 
are the benchmark money market instruments for the euro area (www.euribor.org).   16 
each month when there is generally a heavy flow of data announcements which are most 
likely to lead to revisions of forecast. Data for macroeconomic announcements, 
consisting of an expectation based on a survey of economists, together with actual, prior 
values for the indicator in question, as well as revisions to previous data releases, were 
obtained from Bloomberg. The figures that are reported are averages. 
We now turn to a description of the announcements data, usually the workhorse 
variable for measuring surprises in high frequency data. Data were obtained from 
Laakkonen (2004) and updated from sources listed in her study. We include 
announcements from the US, the U.K., Japan, the European Union (or euro area), and 
Germany. The total number of available announcements is 83 for the US, 82 for the U.K., 
92 for Japan, 75 for the EU, and 101 for Germany. Because of changes in the data, or the 
absence of a survey component preventing the calculation of a surprise component, the 
fraction of the universe of available announcements actually used was as follows: 34% 
for the US, 22% for the U.K., 20% for Japan, 17% for the EU, and 13% for Germany. 
Consequently, a total of 91 announcements are used, a number far higher than in 
comparable studies of this kind. 
Business cycle information for the US is obtained from the NBER 
(www.nber.or/cycles.html) while, for the euro area, these data are available from the euro 
area business cycle network (www.eabcn.org). Lastly, we searched Factiva 
(www.factiva.com), a news retrieval service for news reports that cited “ECB” and 
“monetary policy”, “interest rate”, or “exchange rate” in the headline and lead paragraph 
and counted the references. This count data is a useful companion to the announcements   17 
data as it can be informative about the intensity with which news reports draw attention 
to central bank actions and words.
13 
This paper also introduces new time series that quantify statements issued by the 
ECB and Federal Reserve, based on information contained in press releases, although 
other central bank publications were also consulted (e.g., monetary policy, inflation 
reports, minutes of meetings, if available). Each press release is dated and interpreted for 
context as well for whether it contains statements that reflect positively or negatively on 
the economic outlook along five dimensions. They are: the exchange rate, output, asset 
prices, fiscal policy, and international developments or considerations. A positive outlook 
signifies that higher real GDP growth, lower inflation are forecast, an appreciating 
currency, or that financial asset prices more generally are considered to be at 
fundamentally sound levels. Dummy variables were then created for each of the media 
releases taking on a value of +1 in the case of a favorable development, a -1 in the event 
of a negative development, and zero otherwise for each of the six categories previously 
mentioned. 
When a press release mentioned more than one of the aforementioned categories all 
such references were recorded. Consider the following example: “In addition, any 
                                                 
13 The count data exclude republished news, recurring pricing and market data, obituaries, 
sports, and calendars. In spirit at least, our count data is similar to the keyword count 
variable created by Cecchetti (2003) to proxy the concerns of the US Fed about stock 
market developments and the possibility of a bubble. While count data is a useful 
indicator, they do not discriminate between news items that look back versus news that 
relates to the economic outlook for the variables of interest.   18 
relaxation of fiscal policies would negatively affect the price climate as well as the 
credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact” (ECB, 7 January 1999). This was interpreted 
as implying a negative outlook for future inflation. “…the euro area has appreciated 
against the currencies of the euro area’ most important trading partners. The Governing 
Council considers the development to be a step in the right direction” (ECB, 14 
December 2000). This statement suggests a positive outlook for the exchange rate. This 
practice was also followed for Federal Open Market Committee statements. 
There are other interpretations of central bank press releases in the literature, such 
as the oral interventions variables constructed by Fratzscher (2004).  In contrast, 
Fratzscher’s (2004) scale focuses exclusively on the connection between monetary policy 
and exchange rate developments. A +1 is assigned to a statement advocating an 
appreciation of the euro, a -1 for a depreciation, and a zero when the statement is 
ambiguous. One difference between Fratzscher’s indicator and ours is that we were more 
interested in isolating statements about future outlook for the economy. After all, it is 
unlikely, a priori, that statements about the exchange rate can be divorced from other 
related economic indicators such as interest rates and inflation. Moreover, our 
classification parses statements into several different categories. As a result, none of the 
statements were felt to be ambiguous about some indicator of economic activity. 
It needs be emphasized that our coding of the words of central bankers is not 
unique. For example, Jansen and de Haan (2005) code statements by all central bankers 
in the euro area, and not only ones emanating from the ECB. However, only the 
comments dealing with the euro are classified. Similarly, Rosa and Verga (2005) focus 
on the contents of ECB press release alone in order to derive a measure that represents   19 
the likelihood of an official interest rate change, and the resulting ordered scale that 
translates the same types of ECB documents considered here into “risk for price stability” 
and “economic growth” categories. 
 
5. Stylized Facts 
Although the ECB communicates frequently, it is more likely to do so around the 
time of the meetings of its Governing Council. To the extent that its meetings, and 
subsequent press conference,
14  influence financial markets this ought to affect the 
volatility of monetary policy and exchange rate shocks. As noted previously, the story of 
the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate cannot be divorced from monetary policy in the US 
Figure 1 plots the ECB main refinancing operations rate and its proximate US equivalent, 
namely the fed funds rate for the 1999-2004 sample covered in this study. For roughly the 
first half of the sample the US policy rate was higher than the comparable rate for the 
euro area. After 2001 the situation is reversed. By the end of 2004 the fed funds rate 
began to edge up over the ECB reference rate. Hence, the sample covers a long enough 
sample wherein the monetary policy stances and economic outlook of the two central 
banks appear to have changed substantially over time. 
Figure 1 about here 
                                                 
14 The Governing Council usually meets twice a month. At its first monthly meeting, the 
policy rate is set while the second meeting is held to discuss other aspects of ECB policy 
making. The table to be discussed below assumes that volatility is potentially affected by 
the first meeting date. We return to this issue below.   20 
Figure 2A plots the standard deviation for selected time series around specific event 
days. They are the rate of change in the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate, the change in the 
EONIA, the differential between the EONIA and the fed funds rate, and the change in the 
implied volatilities for one week options. The events chosen are days when the ECB’s 
Governing Council meets but does not set the policy rate, the day before the Governing 
Council meets, days when the ECB President testifies at the European Parliament, and 
days when the so-called EMU poll of interest rate forecasts is released. For most proxies 
there are considerable differences in the volatility of the underlying time series but this is 
only suggestive of the role of ECB words and deeds as these event days also overlap with 
other news releases. For example, the implied volatilities are substantially more volatile 
on days when the ECB President testifies before the European Parliament. Similarly, the 
EONIA-fed funds rate differential is most volatile around the time of the release of the 
EMU poll of ECB interest rates. Nevertheless, unconditional volatilities give only a 
partial picture of what drives changing volatilities. 
Figure 2 about here 
Turning to the US evidence, as illustrated by Figure 2B, events in the US on days 
when the FOMC meets versus the preceding days also show a modest impact on the 
Euro-US-dollar exchange rate volatility, with more noticeable effects on implied 
volatilities and the EONIA/fed funds interest rate differential. Also shown is the 
relatively higher volatility of fed funds futures reported by several other researchers.
15 
                                                 
15 This result may simply indicate that FOMC meeting days are more newsworthy than 
non-meeting days. Poole and Rasche (2000), Poole, Rasche and Thornton (2002) and 
Kuttner (2001), find that the Fed had become more transparent over time. Indeed,   21 
Figure 3 shows changes in the euro area-US interest rate differential against the rate 
of change in the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate. Presumably, on non-policy days, 
fundamentals and non monetary policy related shocks dominate whereas, on days when 
the Governing Council meets, it is the ECB’s reaction function that predominates. As 
seen in the top portion of Figure 3, the bulk of the scatter suggests no obvious connection 
between changes in the interest rate differential and the rate of appreciation or 
depreciation in the exchange rate on non-policy days. Turning to the same relationship on 
days when the ECB sets its policy rate, there are stronger indications that changes in the 
interest rate differential are negatively related to changes in the exchange rate.
16 
Choosing other pairs of variables does not fundamentally change the story. 
Figure 3 about here 
On announcement days news is given by  t k s , , as defined in equation (1). On non-
announcement days the time series are assigned a value of 0. Given the sheer number of 
announcements a useful way of reducing the dimensionality of the announcements 
variables, while preserving the essential information content of the surprise series, is to 
                                                                                                                                                 
recursive estimates of the mean surprise based on fed funds futures are not statistically 
different from zero after the end of 2000. Between August 1997 and April 1999, Fed 
directives announced a numeric value of the “intended fed funds rate”. Since May 1999, 
the Fed issues a press statement following each FOMC meeting. In February 2000 the 
Fed replaced its “policy bias” statement with announcement suggesting a “balance of 
risks”. 
16  Indeed, while the covariance between the two time series is negative in the two 
samples, it is almost 16 times larger on policy setting days than on non-meeting days.   22 
resort to a principal components analysis. This was done for the vector of announcements 
for each country separately. This approach permits us to reduce the effective number of 
announcements to 12. Table 1 provides summary statistics as well as listing the 
individual announcements that receive the highest weights. For the US and the U.K., 
three principal components were found while two principal components characterize the 
data for Germany, Japan, and the euro area. Several of the US studies cited earlier also 
find that the producer price index, payroll data and hours worked are salient 
announcements but, as can be seen from Table 1, several other major economic 
announcements also matter. 
Table 1 about here 
More generally, with the exception of the EU, announcements about price and 
output developments are clearly the most important though we note, importantly, that the 
widely reported IFO business climate index is among the announcements that included 
among the principal components. Also interesting to note is the fact that there is an 
asymmetry of sorts over the sample considered in that the average standardized values of 
the principal components of the announcements is positive with the notable exception of 
Japan, where it is negative. Generally, the distribution of the sizes of the surprises is 
fairly similar across countries though the U.K. and the US have experienced a small 
number of relatively large negative announcements and, with the exception of Japan, the 
fraction of bad news announcements is larger than for the eurozone or European Union.
17 
                                                 
17 The eurozone and European Union are not the same but it was not always clear from 
the data which geographical region the announcement refers to.   23 
We conclude by briefly describing some of the more qualitative variables. Several 
features of the data readily stand out. First, while the ECB regularly comments on the 
euro exchange rate, no comparable statements could be found in Federal Open Market 
Committee statements. Second, during the period considered, the Federal Open Market 
Committee did not provide an outlook for fiscal policy or the exchange rate (at least the 
Euro-US-dollar exchange rate). Third, the ECB produced not only relatively more 
commentary about the outlook for inflation but it did so more intensively than the Fed. 
On the other hand, both central banks regularly commented on real economic 
developments (viz., output and output growth). The same is true for commentary about 
the outlook based on foreign developments (viz., primarily the US, but also Asia). Lastly, 
there was relatively little mention by either central bank about asset prices, although the 
ECB became relatively more talkative beginning in 2001.
18 
Finally, Figure 4 provides some information about the content of the Reuters poll of 
expectations regarding the ECB reference rate. We compare the expected size of ECB 
reference rate changes to the actual changes made in the ECB’s main refinancing 
operations rate since 1999. The expected value simply represents a weighted average of 
poll respondents’ views about the likely value of the ECB’s policy rate where the weights 
are the fraction of respondents’ who anticipated either no change, a 25 bp rise or fall, or a 
50 bp rise or fall, these being the categories used in the poll. 
Figure 4 about here 
                                                 
18 One should not conclude, of course, that while the Federal Open Market Committee 
was less vocal, in terms of the frequency of utterances about asset price developments, 
that its words had less impact. The opposite could well be correct.   24 
The Figure reveals that, in 2000 and 2001, the Reuters poll participants largely 
predicted the direction of change in the ECB’s key rate even if they somewhat 
underestimated the size of the change. The same is generally true of expectations after 
2001, with expected changes settling very close to zero by the end of 2003, when the 
ECB ceased to change its policy rate, at least until the end of our sample. Nevertheless, 
there is considerable volatility in expected changes in the ECB policy rate based on the 
polling data. In the empirical work to follow we make use of this and other features noted 
above to determine what drives the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate since 1999 and the role 
of ECB spoken words. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
Table 2 shows a selection of coefficient estimates from equation (3) and (11). A 
total of 31 different definitions for MP  were considered. Due to the possibility of 
endogeneity discussed earlier, we first conducted a Hausman test on the mean equation.
19 
Results (not shown) suggest that OLS estimates are inconsistent (that is, the null of 
unbiasedness and consistency is rejected) unless equation (3) is conditioned on the 
principal components of news and our proxy for ECB statements. However, when 
                                                 
19 This consists in estimating equation (3) and estimating an auxiliary equation where the 
residuals from (3) enter as a separate regressor. If the estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant, then the null of consistency of OLS coefficient estimates is rejected.   25 
equation (3) includes both of these variables the Hausman test rejects the null of 
consistency in only 4 of 31 definitions for MP examined.
20 
Table 2 about here 
Table 2 reveals that statements that specifically focus on exchange rate 
developments are the only ones often, though not always, found to be statistically 
significant. We also experimented with a proxy for the impact of ECB statements that 
aggregates all of the 5 categories of statements defined above but this variable is 
insignificant in the various regressions. This suggests that there is some added value in 
disaggregating statements according to the economic variable being discussed by the 
central bank. Further, commentary by the ECB concerning the Euro-US-dollar exchange 
rate is always found to produce a depreciation of the euro. In contrast, commentary about 
asset prices (usually stock prices but, occasionally, also housing prices) leads to an 
appreciation of the euro. Indeed, the effect of these statements is seen as essentially 
offsetting those that specifically deal with the exchange rate. Hence, previous studies 
purporting to show that news events have relatively small effects in levels at the daily 
frequency may have reached such a conclusion because they did not sufficiently 
disaggregate the source of news. 
The count variable that proxies the intensity with which reports about the euro and 
interest rates in the euro area are reported in the media is also statistically significant, and 
                                                 
20 They are the two week eurepo rate, the 12 month, 9 month, and overnight euro area-US 
interest rate differential. When only C  appears in (3), OLS is inconsistent in all 31 cases. 
When news (i.e., Z ) only appears in the regression the null of consistency of OLS 
estimates is rejected in 19 of 31 cases considered.   26 
always negative, in 4 of the 6 cases reported in Table 2. Therefore, more frequent 
reporting of news items dealing with MP  and  e Δ   leads to an appreciation of the 
currency, though the coefficient is relatively small. Three other results are noteworthy. 
First, as theory would predict a rise in euro area interest rates or in the euro area-US 
interest differential leads to an appreciation of the euro in all but one case shown in the 
Table. Moreover, at longer maturities, such as one year, the impact of interest rate 
changes on the exchange rate dwarfs those from ECB statements by a wide margin. It is 
also worth noting that a rise in the implied volatility of foreign exchange options, an 
indication that markets are bearish about the euro, is indeed seen as leading to a 
depreciation of the currency. Second, US interest rate developments also impact 
separately on the rate of change in the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate. The estimated 
coefficients can only be understood as an indication that contemporaneous increases in 
some US rates, in particular Libor rates set in London, lead to an expectation of higher 
euro area rates and hence to a current appreciation of the euro. Third, in half the cases 
shown, estimates of foreign exchange reserves published by Reuters are significant with 
the negative sign implying that positive foreign exchange reserve growth portends an 
appreciation in the euro, presumably because accumulating reserves can then serve as a 
means to raise the value of the euro currency. 
Turning to the EGARCH(1,1) estimates we find that in over half the cases shown, 
particularly ones that focus on the outlook for the euro, ECB statements lead to a 
diminution of exchange rate volatility. This suggests that such statements can be 
construed as being informative in the sense that these reduce the risks surrounding 
exchange rate developments. An increase in the frequency of news count dealing with   27 
exchange rate and interest rate developments is also seen as reducing exchange rate 
volatility and the same result holds for positive growth in foreign exchange reserves. In 
both cases, however, the coefficients are much smaller than those capturing the impact of 
ECB commentary and interest rates on exchange rate volatility. Finally, it is interesting to 
observe that statements from the FOMC, constructed in the same manner as the ones used 
to construct the proxies for ECB communications activities, have almost no separate 
impact on the euro/USD exchange rate. 
Next, we turn to the results of the Rigobon-Sack (2004) procedure. Table 3 presents 
coefficient estimates for a selected set of definitions for MP . Four separate definitions of 
policy ) (P  and non-policy days  ) (NP  are considered. They are the days when the ECB’s 
Governing Council meets, the day before these same meetings,
21 days when the ECB 
President delivers a speech about developments and prospects concerning the euro 
exchange rate, and days when the FOMC meets to set the target for the fed funds rate. 
Table 3 about here 
Estimates of θ  are statistically significant in almost all cases when P  is defined as 
the day before the Governing Council meets while α   is generally insignificant. 
Therefore, communication has a significant effect on the euro exchange rate. This result, 
while consistent with traditional time series model estimates shown above, also highlights 
the crucial distinction between policy and non-policy days. By contrast, no statistically 
reaction was found when P  consists of days when the ECB sets its policy rates or when 
the Federal Open Market Committee meets in Washington (not shown). Only a handful 
                                                 
21  This mainly, though not always, coincides with the release of the Reuters poll of 
interest rate expectations.   28 
of coefficients are statistically significant when P  includes days when the ECB President 
delivered speeches that deal with the outlook for the euro area (not shown). The cases 
highlighted in bold characters are the ones where an earlier Hausman test rejected the 
consistency of OLS estimates suggestive of the endogeneity of MP  and  e Δ . Focusing on 
days when P  is defined as the day before Governing Council meetings we conclude that 
ECB statements lead to a depreciation of the exchange rates. 
Turning to the impact of MP  and  e Δ  we typically find that tighter policies lead, as 
would be expected, to an appreciation of the euro but only one statistically significant 
instance is found. The column labelled  H p  gives the p-value for the Hausman test of the 
null that the heteroskedastic and event study estimators are equal.
22 Rejections of the null, 
that is, the assumption used in event studies, occur only when MP  is measured by a euro 
area-US interest rate differential. Overall, the time series, event study, and Rigobon-Sack 
procedures highlight the important role that central bank communication can play. 
However, the heteroskedasticity based identification procedure emphasizes that the 
timing of communication plays a significant role in whether a statistically significant link 
between communication and the exchange rate. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has presented estimates of the impact of interest rates and ECB 
communication policies on the Euro-US-dollar exchange rate. We introduce a new 
indicator of ECB communications policies that focuses on what the ECB says about the 
                                                 
22 P-values are given for one case only as they are broadly similar for the other definitions 
of P  and NP considered.   29 
future economic outlook for the euro area along 5 different economic dimensions. Time 
series and event study approaches are employed, as well as the heteroskedasticity 
estimator proposed by Rigobon and Sack (2004). 
Three broad conclusions emerge. First, the impact of ECB communications policies 
is more apparent in the time series framework than in the heteroskedasticity estimator 
approach. Second, previous studies that conclude that news effects are significant at the 
daily frequency may have reached such a conclusion because the measurement of news 
was too highly aggregated. When news effects are disaggregated they are often found to 
be individually statistically significant. Third, the endogeneity of the exchange rate-
interest rate relationship is more apparent when the proxy for monetary policy is the euro 
area-US differential than when any other proxy for monetary policy is employed. Finally, 
interest rate changes generally have a much larger impact on exchange rate movements, 
and their volatility, than do ECB verbal pronouncements. As a result, policy deeds can be 
interpreted as having a bigger impact on the euro than policy words. 
Potential limitations of our study include the focus on daily data, and the omission 
of trading volume information. While it is unclear, based on existing published estimates, 
whether these would overturn our results, future research ought to investigate these 
possibilities more fully. It would also be interesting to determine in a more rigorous 
fashion whether the results presented here are robust to different methodologies to 
interpret and codify central bankers’ words. These extensions are left for future research. 
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Table 1: Summary of Principal Components Analysis 
 
  Size of Standardized Announcement 
Country/Region [-40,30)  [-20,-10] [-10,0)  [0,10)  [10,20) 
  % of total sample 
US 1  0.06  0.26  6.83  92.72  0.13 
US 2    0.26  8.88  90.61  0.26 




US 1: industrial production, capacity utilization, producer price index, 
current account balance, business inventories; US 2: average weekly 
hours, change in manufacturing payrolls, change in non-farm payrolls, 
wholesale inventories; US 3: new home sales, GDP deflator, GDP, 
unemployment rate  
GER 1    0.32  2.94  96.62  0.13 




GER 1: unemployment change, unemployment rate; GER 2: 
construction orders, IFO business climate index, import price index, 
harmonized CPI 
UK 1  0.06  0.26  6.83  92.72  0.13 
UK 2    0.26  8.88  90.61  0.26 




UK 1: industrial production, manufacturing prodiction; UK 2: RPI 
index, RPI ex mortgage payments 
EA 1    0.13  3.96  95.85  0.06 




EA 1: consumer confidence, retail trade (EU 15), eurozone retail trade, 
unemployment rate; EA 2: business climate indicator, unemployment 
rate, eurozone retail trade, retail trade (EU 15), consumer confidence 
JA 1    0.13  91.19  8.25  0.45 




JA 1: unemployment rate, CPI; JA 2: construction orders, housing 
starts, job to applicant ratio, vehicle sales, workers’ household 
spending 
Notes: US is United States, GER is Germany, UK is the United Kingdom, EA is the 
eurozone or European Union, JA is Japan. The numbers in column 1 refer to the principal 
component. Laakkonen (2004) provides a complete list of annoucements.    36 
Table 2: Coefficient Estimates: Mean and Variance Equations 
Panel A: Mean Equations, Dependent Variable  t e Δ  




EONIA  -0.37 0.15 GER 2 US 2 
FEDFUNDS  -0.03 0.12   US 3 
ECB_ALL  0.04 0.03     
FOMC_ALL  -0.01 0.04     
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.001 0.00     
ECB_RESERVES  -0.01 0.01     
Memo          
ECB_ER  0.31 0.14     
EUREPO, 12 MONTHS  -4.39 1.11 US 4  
US LIBOR, 12 MONTHS  -4.45 0.82   
ECB_ALL  -0.02 0.04   
FOMC_ALL  0.05 0.09   
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  0.0004 0.001   
ECB_RESERVES  0.004 0.01   
Memo        
ECB_A  -0.40 0.14   
ECB_ER  0.26 0.12   
EURO-US INTEREST RATE 
DIFFERENCE, OVERNIGHT  -0.37 0.15 US 2  
FEDFUNDS  -0.40 0.19 US 3  
ECB_ALL  0.04 0.03  
FOMC_ALL  -0.01 0.04  
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.001 0.0006  
ECB_RESERVES  -0.01 0.005  
Memo        
ECB_REL_ER  0.31 0.14  
EURO-US INTEREST RATE 
DIFFEREENCE, 12 MONTHS  -1.98 0.58  
US LIBOR 12 MONTHS  -5.23 0.51  
ECB_ALL  0.03 0.03  
FOMC_ALL  -0.03 0.04  
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.001 0.0006  
ECB_RESERVES  -0.01 0.005  
Memo        
ECB_A  -0.26 0.16  
ECB_ER  0.27 0.13    37 
Table 2: Coefficient Estimates: Mean and Variance Equations (Continued) 
EURO-US INTEREST RATE 
DIFFERENCE, 1 DAY  -0.20 0.25  
FEDFUNDS  0.15 0.44  
ECB_ALL  -0.03 0.04  
FOMC_ALL  0.10 0.13  
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  0.0003 0.001  
ECB_RESERVES  -4.04E-05 0.01  
IMPLIED VOLATILITY, 12 
MONTHS  0.52 0.18  
US LIBOR, 12 MONTHS  -4.43 0.48  
ECB_ALL  0.03 0.03  
FOMC_ALL  -0.03 0.04  
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.0009 0.0006  
ECB_RESERVES  -0.009 0.006  
Memo           
ECB_ER  0.29 0.13  
Panel B: Conditional Variance Equation ln( ) t h  
Asymmetry Term ( 1 τ )  0.004 0.01 EA 1  US 1 
EONIA  -0.004 0.21 EA 2  US 2 
FEDFUNDS  0.69 0.24 JA 1    
ECB_ER  -0.20 0.11 JA 2    
FOMC_ALL  -0.07 0.04      
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.0005 0.0002      
ECB_RESERVES  -0.007 0.002      
Asymmetry Term ( 1 τ )  -0.07 0.11 UK 1   
EUREPO, 12 MONTHS  -0.34 0.17 UK 2   
US LIBOR, 12 MONTHS  -2.76 1.88     
ECB_A  -0.93 0.86     
ECB_ER  -1.48 0.99     
FOMC_ALL  -0.04 0.50     
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.002 0.004     
ECB_RESERVES  -0.02 0.06     
Asymmetry Term ( 1 τ )  0.004 0.01EA 1  US 1 
EURO-US INTEREST RATE 
DIFFERENCE, OVERNIGHT  -0.001 0.21EA 2  US 2 
FEDFUNDS  0.69 0.30JA 1    
ECB_ALL  -0.20 0.11JA 2    
FOMC_ALL  -0.07 0.04     
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.0005 0.0003     
ECB_RESERVES  -0.007 0.002       38 
Table 2: Coefficient Estimates: Mean and Variance Equations (Continued) 
Asymmetry Term ( 1 τ )  0.06 0.04 JA 2  US 4 
EURO-US INTEREST RATE 
DIFFERENCE, 12 MONTHS  -0.84 0.06 UK 1    
US LIBOR, 12 MONTHS  1.42 0.92 US 2    
ECB_REL_A  -0.21 0.26      
ECB_REL_ER  -0.77 0.45      
FOMC_REL_ALL  -0.08 0.10      
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.0009 0.002      
ECB_RESERVES_D  -0.04 0.03      
Asymmetry Term ( 1 τ )  -0.15 0.05 UK 3   
EURO-US INTEREST RATE 
DIFFERENCE, 1 DAY  -0.33 0.56 US 3   
FEDFUNDS  -0.40 0.99     
ECB_ALL  -0.77 0.71     
FOMC_ALL  -0.17 0.33     
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.005 0.003     
ECB_RESERVES  -0.10 0.07     
Asymmetry Term ( 1 τ )  -0.03 0.04   
IMPLIED VOLATILITIES, 12 
MONTHS  1.70 0.21   
US LIBOR, 12 MONTHS  0.24 0.78   
ECB_ER  -0.58 0.56   
FOMC_ALL  -0.12 0.23   
ECB_NEWSCOUNT  -0.003 0.003   
ECB_RESERVES  -0.03 0.03   
Notes: See Table 1 for principal components analysis. Time series estimates of 
equations (2) and (2A) are shown. Not all coefficients estimated are shown to 
conserve space. Only coefficients on MP, and C, and a list of the news variables 
(principal components) that were statistically significant at least at the 10% 
level. Statistically significant coefficients are in bold characters. Under Memo, 
only the coefficients on C where alternative definitions of C that were found to 
be significant are shown. ECB_ALL and FOMC_ALL are dummy variables that 
capture the aggregated outlook for five economic aggregates. The text provides 
definitions. The same applies to ECB_ER (exchange rate), ECB_A (asset series). 
ECB_NEWSCOUNT is a count variable for news items as described in the text 
while ECB_RESERVES are the Reuters estimates of ECB foreign exchange 
reserves, available on a weekly basis. The various proxies for MP are shown, for 
example, as EONIA, which is the EONIA interest rate. All interest rates enter in 
first differences, as do US measures of MP which also enter the various 
equations and are shown immediately below the euro area measure of MP.  39 
Table 3: Estimates of Reaction of MPt to  t e Δ  and Ct 
  P = ECB GC Meeting Days  P = Day Before ECB GC Meeting 
Monetary Policy Proxy  α   θ   H p   α   θ  
EONIA  -0.42 (0.75)   0.05 (0.15)  0.15  -0.62 (0.75)   0.30 (0.15) 
Euribor, 12 Months   1.98 (6.63)   0.07 (0.13)  0.99  -5.32 (3.89)   0.34 (0.15) 
Euribor, 3 Months  -11.40 (19.00)   0.07 (0.16)  0.44  -0.73 (1.63)   0.32 (0.15) 
Euribor, 6 Months   1.17 (2.16)   0.08 (0.13)  0.45   2.86 (1.73)   0.35 (0.16) 
Euribor, 9 Months  -2.54 (2.51)   0.03 (0.14)  0.80   1.75 (1.35)   0.37 (0.17) 
Euribor, 1 Month  -2.18 (7.53)   0.08 (0.21)  0.48  -1.18 (6.31)  -0.30 (0.30) 
Euribor, 1 Week  -5.75 (7.65)  -0.01 (0.16)  0.21  -1.80 (1.18)   0.32 (0.15) 
Euro Area-US Interest Rate 
Difference, Overnight 
 1.38 (1.11)   0.17 (0.18)  0.01   0.29 (0.41)   0.36 (0.16) 
Euro Area-US Interest Rate 
Difference, 12 Months 
-7.74 (9.37)   0.12 (0.17)  0.09  -3.54 (2.51)   0.37 (0.17) 
Euro Area-US Interest Rate 
Difference, 9 Months 
-3.96 (5.34)   0.08 (0.14)  0.02  -4.44 (2.37)   0.37 (0.16) 
Implied Volatilities, 12 Months   0.95 (1.94)   0.04 (0.16)  0.66   0.42 (0.48)   0.33 (0.15) 
Implied Volatilities, 1 Month   0.75 (0.77)   0.18 (0.20)  0.12   0.32 (0.33)   0.41 (0.18) 
Implied Volatilities, 1 Week   0.51 (0.46)  -0.11 (0.29)  0.39   0.12 (0.10)   0.31 (0.13) 
Implied Volatilities, 3 Months   0.99 (1.52)   0.002 (0.21)  0.89   0.22 (0.27)   0.32 (0.15) 
Implied Volatilities, 6 Months   4.38 (10.43)  -0.11 (.54)  0.96   0.28 (0.42)   0.32 (0.15) 
Note: Estimates in bold are statistically significant at least at the 10% level significance level.  H p  is the p-value for 
the Hausman test whether the estimates using the heteroskedasticity estimator is significantly differ from the event 
study estimator. P represents policy days; the remaining days in the sample are the non-policy days (NP). ECB GC 
refers to the ECB’s Governing Council.   40 
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Source: See text. ECB MRO is the ECB’s main financing operations rate, FEDFUNDS 
TARGET is the US Federal Reserve’s target for the fed funds rate.   41 
Figure 2: Volatility on Event and Non-Event Days 
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Note: The vertical axes are the variances of the relevant time series over the event days 
listed under each bar. Details about the dating of events and sources are in the text or in 
the appendix.  42 
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Note: O/N is the overnight rate. Data definitions and sources are in the text as well as in 
an appendix.   43 
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Note: See Figure 1. Reuters poll expected rate is 
25 50 25 50 0 .25 .50 .25 .50 .00 f ff f f
−− +− − + , 
where f
 i is the fraction of poll respondents who expect an i% change in the ECB’s key 
policy rate, and i=.25,.50,-.25,.-.50,.00. Prior to 2002, data for f
 i were not published, only 
aggregate sentiment concerning the direction and size of the expected change in the 
ECB’s key policy rate. 